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Pro se appellant Daniel Heffley appeals after the District Court dismissed his in 
forma pauperis lawsuit alleging, among other things, violations of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 
504”).1  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm. 
On August 29, 2018, Heffley initiated this action against the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the Judicial Conduct Board of 
Pennsylvania, and the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.  In pertinent part, he 
claimed that that six actions taken during his child custody proceedings in state court 
violated the ADA and Section 504.  The District Court subsequently granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the claims relating to the six actions were 
untimely under the applicable statute of limitations.2 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the 
District Court’s decision to grant a motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds.  
See Algrant v. Evergreen Valley Nurseries Ltd. P’ship, 126 F.3d 178, 181 (3d Cir. 1997).  
 
1 Heffley brought several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well, but the District Court 
dismissed these claims sua sponte on screening the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), and 
Heffley did not challenge that order in his brief.  Accordingly, Heffley has forfeited any challenge to the 
dismissal of those claims.  See M.S. by & through Hall v. Susquehanna Twp. Sch. Dist., 969 F.3d 120, 124 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2020).   
 
2 Heffley also brought claims for violations of the ADA and Section 504, based on a seventh event, which 
the District Court concluded were timely, but meritless.  Heffley has forfeited any challenge to the 
dismissal on the merits of these claim by failing to raise them in his brief.  See M.S. by & through Hall, 




The District Court may grant such a motion when the time-bar is apparent on the face of 
the complaint.  See Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014).  In addition to 
considering the allegations in the complaint, courts may consider exhibits submitted with 
the complaint and matters of public record.  Id.   
The District Court did not err in concluding that Heffley’s ADA and Section 504 
claims were untimely.  These claims are subject to Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of 
limitations on personal injury actions.  See Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. 
Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 208 (3d Cir. 2008).  The statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, that he has been injured and that 
another party’s conduct caused his injury.  Id. at 214, 216.  
As accurately detailed by the District Court, it is clear from the complaint and 
attached exhibits that the ADA and Section 504 claims were based on events that 
occurred and were discoverable by Heffley before August 29, 2016 (the limitations date).  
Some of the events took place while Heffley was present in court, and Heffley discussed 
most of the events in documents he filed before the limitations date in state court and 
other fora.  Heffley asserts that he, by virtue of his disabilities, could not have reasonably 
known of the alleged wrongs.  However, “[t]he determination of the time at which a 
claim accrues is an objective inquiry; we ask not what the plaintiff actually knew but 
what a reasonable person should have known.”  Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 




himself knew of them before the limitations date.  Regardless, it is clear that a reasonable 
plaintiff should have known of the alleged injuries before the limitations date.   
Furthermore, the District Court did not err in concluding that there was no basis 
for tolling the statute of limitations.  To the extent that Heffley’s brief can be read as 
challenging the District Court’s rejection of his continuing violations theory for tolling, 
his argument fails because the claims arose from isolated, distinct events.  See Cowell v. 
Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that “when a defendant’s 
conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act 
evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period”).   
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  Heffley’s motion 
for leave to file supplemental appendix with reply brief and his supplemental motion for 
leave to submit an additional response are both granted. 
